Comparison of the group-buying auction and the fixed pricing mechanism
Comparison of the group-buying auction and the fixed pricing mechanism
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DOI：
10.1016/j.dss.2006.11.002
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发表时间：
2007-03
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Jing Chen;Xilong Chen;Xiping Song
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jing Chen;Xilong Chen;Xiping Song
随着电子商务的发展，网上拍卖在电子市场中扮演着重要的角色。本文以团购拍卖(GBA)为例分析了卖家的定价策略，GBA是一种流行的在线拍卖形式，旨在聚合买家获得批量折扣的能力。基于投标人的随机到达过程和具有独立私人价值模型的最优策略，分析了在统一单位成本情况下和在多个供应链协调合同下的GBA的卖方最优价格曲线。我们发现最优贴现率为零，这意味着最优GBA等价于最优固定定价机制(FPM)。然后我们比较了GBA和FPM-在规模经济和寻求风险的卖家两种特殊情况下，发现(1)当考虑规模经济时，GBA的表现优于FPM；(2)当卖家寻求风险时，GBA的表现也优于FPM。
With the development of electronic commerce, online auction plays an important role in the electronic market. This paper analyzes the seller's pricing strategy with the group-buying auction (GBA), a popular form of online auction, which is designed to aggregate the power of buyers to gain volume discounts. Based on the bidders' stochastic arrival process and optimal strategy with independent private value model, this paper analyzes the sellers' optimal price curve of the GBA in the uniform unit cost case and in some supply chain coordination contracts. We find that the best discount rate is zero, which implies the optimal GBA is equivalent to the optimal fixed pricing mechanism (FPM). Then we compare the GBA with the FPM—in two special cases, the economies of scale and risk-seeking seller, and find that (1) when economies of scale are considered, the GBA outperforms the FPM; (2) when the seller is risk-seeking, the GBA also outperforms the FPM.