Unemployment Insurance and Labor Contracts under Asymmetric Information: Theory and Facts
Unemployment Insurance and Labor Contracts under Asymmetric Information: Theory and Facts
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信息不对称下的失业保险和劳动合同：理论与事实
DOI：
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发表时间：
1986
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
A. Oswald
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Oswald
该论文提供的证据表明，许多美国劳动合同很少或根本没有私人失业保险条款。提出了一种不对称信息下、没有私人失业保险的可选合同模型。就业不足和非自愿失业可能并存。美国经济协会版权所有 1986。
The paper provides evidence to show that many U.S. labor contracts havelittle or no private unemployment insurance provision. A model of an optional contract under asymmetric information, with no private unemployment insurance, is presented. Underemployment and involuntaryunemployment may coexist. Copyright 1986 by American Economic Association.