Ifs, though, and because
Ifs, though, and because
复制标题
不过，如果，并且因为
作者：
H. Rott
每个人都知道if和because 1是相关连词。Goodman（1954，p. 14）认为Because A？等价于它的”逆置”，虚拟条件语句If？\那么是B？A2和Ryle（1963，第317页）至少看到了Because AB和虚拟条件语句//？然后，如果？我认为，在Ramsey（1931，p.248）中已经找到了共同的信念，他同时提到了If p then q和Because pq，指出”当p已知为真时，因为仅仅是//的一个变体”。哲学的初学者已经可以从布劳备受推崇的预备论中学到同样的东西（1982，1983，第43页，我的翻译？lation）：“与//密切相关的是部分真值函数运算符because，since，therefore，therefore，etc.在我看来，它们本质上是A和if A then JB的合取。“我想把拉姆齐和布劳的观点称为对因为和如果之间关系的主流分析（在下文中，“主流分析”）。没有人知道if和because之间的确切关系。这一点在现代哲学中被注意到的差异中得到了惊人的证明。而if由于一直处于阴影中，而受到了条件逻辑的大量关注。我认为我们应该更公正地对待because，并将冒险对这两个连词进行平行分析。在探讨这一点时，我不会过早地对上面提到的观点之一作出承诺。相反，我想从这个想法开始，因为总是指向一个原因或解释。在下一节中，我们将引用三个关于条件句、原因和解释的有希望的解释的基本思想。这些解释的共同特点是它们依赖于认识主体的信念。在第3节中，我将描述用于我的分析的简单信念模型。在第4节中，建议分析条件句（即，拉姆齐测试）被发现是不够的，根据主流分析，这指向一个修改，即，到
Everybody knows that if and because1 are related conjunctions. Goodman (1954, p. 14) takes Because A? to be equivalent to its" contrapositive", the subjunctive conditional statement If?\B then?\A2, and Ryle (1963, p. 317) sees at least a truth conditional equality between Because AB and the subjunctive conditional statement//?\A then~ if?. The common belief, I think, is already found in Ramsey (1931, p. 248), who mentions If p then q and Because pq in the same breath stating" because is merely a variant on//when p is known to be true". Beginners in philosophy can already learn much the same from Blau's highly esteemed propaedeutics (1982, 1983, p. 43, my trans? lation):" Closely related to//, are the partial truth functional operators because, since, hence, therefore, etc. It seems to me they are essentially the conjunction of A and if A then JB." I would like to call the view of Ramsey and Blau the mainstream analysis of the relationship between because and if (in the following," Mainstream Analysis"). Nobody knows the exact relationship between if and because. This is strikingly documented by the difference in attention that has been paid to//and because in modern philosophy. Whereas if has gained abundant care by the meanwhile proliferating conditional logics because has remained in the shadows. I think we should do more justice to because and shall venture a parallel analysis of both conjunctions. In approaching this I won't prematurely commit myself to one of the views mentioned above. Instead I want to start with the idea that because always points to a reason or an explanation. In the next section, the basic ideas of three promising accounts of conditionals, reasons, and explanations are cited. The common feature of these accounts is that they rely on the beliefs of an epistemic subject. In section 3, I shall describe the simple model of beliefs to be used for my analysis. In section 4, the suggested analysis of conditionals (viz., the Ramsey test) is found to be inadequate in the light of the Mainstream Analysis, which points to a modification, viz., to the