Changes in Analysts’ Information Environment Following Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Global Settlement
Changes in Analysts’ Information Environment Following Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Global Settlement
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1008986
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发表时间：
2009-08
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Joy Begley;Yanmin Gao;Q. Cheng
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Joy Begley;Yanmin Gao;Q. Cheng
本文探讨了围绕2002年萨班斯-奥克斯利法案（SOX）和全球结算（GS）的治理和监管改革如何影响分析师的信息环境，特别是金融分析师的公共和私人信息的质量。我们的信息质量指标是基于巴伦、金、林和史蒂文斯（1998）提出的金融分析师预测的特征。我们发现，SOX法案的通过和并行的分析师法规与共同信息的质量在其采用后的临时增加，但增加并没有保持。在实行改革一年后，公共和私人信息质量下降，并继续保持在SOX/GS之前的水平以下。这种下降在改革前具有高信息质量的公司中明显可见，但具有中等或低信息质量的公司几乎没有任何改善。这些结果表明，总体而言，金融分析师并没有经历过他们的信息质量的增加，衡量他们的预测的特点。
This paper examines how governance and regulatory reforms surrounding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 and the Global Settlement (GS) affect the analysts’ information environment, specifically the quality of financial analysts’ common and private information. Our information quality measures are based on characteristics of financial analyst forecasts as developed in Barron, Kim, Lim and Stevens (1998). We find that the passage of SOX and the concurrent analyst regulations are associated with a temporary increase in the quality of common information upon their adoption, but the increase is not maintained. By one year after the introduction of the reforms both common and private information quality decline and continue to stay below their pre-SOX/GS levels. This decline is clearly seen in firms with high information quality prior to the reforms, but firms with moderate or low prior information quality experience little if any improvement. These results suggest that overall, financial analysts have not experienced an increase in their information quality as measured by the characteristics of their forecasts.