Information-Theoretic Approach to Strategic Communication as a Hierarchical Game
Information-Theoretic Approach to Strategic Communication as a Hierarchical Game
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DOI：
10.1109/jproc.2016.2575858
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发表时间：
2015-10
影响因子：
20.6
通讯作者：
E. Akyol;Cédric Langbort;T. Başar
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
E. Akyol;Cédric Langbort;T. Başar
本文从信息理论的透镜出发，对起源于经济学的信息披露问题进行了分析。这些问题与信息论中的传统通信范式完全不同，因为它们涉及编码器和解码器的不同目标，编码器和解码器意识到这种不匹配并相应地采取行动。这导致，在我们的设置中，到一个层次的通信游戏，发射机宣布一个编码策略与充分的承诺，其失真的措施取决于一个私人信息序列，其实现是在发射机。接收机基于所通告的编码映射和统计信息来决定其解码策略，该解码策略使其自身的失真最小化。三个问题的设置被认为是，专注于二次失真的措施，并联合高斯源和私人信息：压缩，通信和简单的平衡条件，没有任何压缩或通信。均衡策略和相关成本的特点。然后将分析扩展到接收方信息设置，并确定最优策略结构的主要变化。最后，扩展的结果分散随机控制的更广泛的背景下。
This paper analyzes the information disclosure problems originated in economics through the lens of information theory. Such problems are radically different from the conventional communication paradigms in information theory since they involve different objectives for the encoder and the decoder, which are aware of this mismatch and act accordingly. This leads, in our setting, to a hierarchical communication game, where the transmitter announces an encoding strategy with full commitment, and its distortion measure depends on a private information sequence whose realization is available at the transmitter. The receiver decides on its decoding strategy that minimizes its own distortion based on the announced encoding map and the statistics. Three problem settings are considered, focusing on the quadratic distortion measures, and jointly Gaussian source and private information: compression, communication, and the simple equilibrium conditions without any compression or communication. The equilibrium strategies and associated costs are characterized. The analysis is then extended to the receiver side information setting and the major changes in structure of optimal strategies are identified. Finally, an extension of the results to the broader context of decentralized stochastic control is presented.