A simple and robust handover authentication between HeNB and eNB in LTE networks
A simple and robust handover authentication between HeNB and eNB in LTE networks
复制标题
LTE 网络中 HeNB 和 eNB 之间简单而鲁棒的切换认证
DOI：
10.1016/j.comnet.2012.02.012
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发表时间：
2012-05-24
影响因子：
5.6
通讯作者：
Lai, Chengzhe
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Cao, Jin;Li, Hui;Lai, Chengzhe
在长期演进（LTE）无线网络中存在两种类型的基站。家庭eNodeB（HeNB）和eNodeB（eNB）。为了实现HeNB和eNB之间的无缝切换，对于支持LTE网络中的移动性至关重要。由第三代合作伙伴计划（3GPP）建议的从eNB/HeNB到新eNB/HeNB的切换需要具有复杂密钥管理机制的用于不同移动性场景的不同过程，这将增加系统复杂性。此外，它不能实现切换过程中的后向安全性。此外，用于其它无线网络的现有切换方案由于其固有特征而不适合于LTE网络中的移动性场景。在本文中，我们提出了一种快速和安全的切换认证方案，这是适合在LTE网络中的所有移动性的场景。与其他切换方案相比，该方案不仅实现了简单的认证过程，而且具有理想的效率，还提供了一些安全特性，包括完美的前向/后向保密（PBS/PFS），这是以前的工作中从未实现过的。实验结果和AVISPA工具的形式化验证表明，该方案是有效的，对各种恶意攻击是安全的。(C)2012 Elsevier B. V.保留所有权利。
There are two types of base stations in the Long Term Evolution (LTE) wireless networks. Home eNodeB (HeNB) and eNodeB (eNB). To achieve seamless handovers between the HeNB and the eNB is critical to support mobility in the LTE networks. A handover from an eNB/HeNB to a new eNB/HeNB, suggested by the third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), requires distinct procedures for different mobility scenarios with a complex key management mechanism, which will increase the system complexity. Besides, it cannot achieve backward security in handover procedures. Furthermore, the existing handover schemes for other wireless networks are not suitable for the mobility scenarios in the LTE networks due to their inherent features. In this paper, we propose a fast and secure handover authentication scheme, which is to fit in with all of the mobility scenarios in the LTE networks. Compared with other handover schemes, our scheme cannot only achieve a simple authentication process with desirable efficiency, but also provide several security features including Perfect Forward/Backward Secrecy (PBS/PFS), which has never been achieved by previous works. The experimental results and formal verification by using the AVISPA tool show that the proposed scheme is efficient and secure against various malicious attacks. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.