Subsidy or tax policy for new technology adoption in duopoly with quadratic and linear cost functions
Subsidy or tax policy for new technology adoption in duopoly with quadratic and linear cost functions
复制标题
具有二次和线性成本函数的双寡头采用新技术的补贴或税收政策
作者：
Masahiko Hattori;Yasuhito Tanaka
本文对具有同质产品的双寡头垄断企业采用新技术的补贴(或税收)政策进行了分析。技术本身是免费的。然而，公司必须为采用新技术支付固定的启动成本，例如员工的教育成本。我们假设线性需求函数，并考虑了两种类型的企业成本函数。二次成本函数和线性成本函数。根据建立成本的水平和成本函数的形式，存在最优政策的各种情况。具体地说，在线性成本函数下，存在以下情况。当一家企业采用新技术时，社会福利最大化，然而，两家企业都采用新技术，没有补贴，也没有税收。然后，政府应该对一家公司或两家公司都征税。在二次成本函数下，不存在征税情况。在二次成本函数和线性成本函数下都存在补贴情况。
We present an analysis about subsidy (or tax) policy for adoption of new technology in a duopoly with a homogeneous good. Technology itself is free. However, firms must expend fixed set-up costs for adoption of new technology, for example, education costs of their staffs. We assume linear demand function, and consider two types of cost functions of firms. Quadratic cost functions and linear cost functions. There are various cases of optimal policies depending on the level of the set-up cost and the forms of cost functions. In particular, under linear cost functions there is the following case. The social welfare is maximized when one firm adopts new technology, however, both firms adopt new technology without subsidy nor tax. Then, the government should impose taxes on one firm or both firms. Under quadratic cost functions there exists no taxation case. There are subsidization cases both under quadratic and linear cost functions.