Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study
Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study
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DOI：
10.1007/s00199-006-0186-3
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发表时间：
2007-10-01
期刊：
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
Vesterlund, Lise
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Potters, Jan;Sefton, Martin;Vesterlund, Lise
我们报告的实验结果的影响，在自愿捐款游戏的领导。与最近的理论一致，我们发现，在领导者拥有关于贡献回报的私人信息的环境中，以身作则会增加贡献和收入（Hermalin in Am Econ Rev 88：1188-1206，1998; Vesterlund in J Public Econ 87：627-657，2003）。相比之下，当回报众所周知时，以身作则的能力对总贡献和收入没有影响。因此，在我们的环境中，领导力的成功似乎是由信号驱动的，而不是由互惠等非金钱因素驱动的。
We report experimental results on the effect of leadership in a voluntary contribution game. Consistent with recent theories we find that leading-by-example increases contributions and earnings in an environment where a leader has private information about the returns from contributing (Hermalin in Am Econ Rev 88:1188-1206, 1998; Vesterlund in J Public Econ 87:627-657, 2003). In contrast the ability to lead-by-example has no effect on total contributions and earnings when such returns are commonly known. In our environment the success of leadership therefore appears to be driven by signaling rather than by nonpecuniary factors such as reciprocity.