Cryptanalysis of the arbitrated quantum signature protocols
Cryptanalysis of the arbitrated quantum signature protocols
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仲裁量子签名协议的密码分析
DOI：
10.1103/physreva.84.022344
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发表时间：
2011-08-29
影响因子：
2.9
通讯作者：
Wen, Qiao-Yan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Gao, Fei;Qin, Su-Juan;Wen, Qiao-Yan
作为一种新的量子消息签名模型，仲裁量子签名（AQS）最近受到了广泛的关注。本文从伪造和否认两个方面研究了以往AQS协议的密码分析。我们证明，在这些协议中，接收者鲍勃可以在已知消息攻击下实现发送者签名的存在伪造。当使用协议来签署经典消息时，鲍勃甚至可以实现通用伪造。此外，发送者爱丽丝可以通过简单的攻击成功地否认她的任何签名。详细描述了攻击策略，并对协议的潜在改进进行了一些讨论。最后我们还提出了 AQS 协议未来研究中的几个有趣的主题。
As a new model for signing quantum message, arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) has recently received a lot of attention. In this paper we study the cryptanalysis of previous AQS protocols from the aspects of forgery and disavowal. We show that in these protocols the receiver Bob can realize existential forgery of the sender’s signature under known message attack. Bob can even achieve universal forgery when the protocols are used to sign a classical message. Furthermore, the sender Alice can successfully disavow any of her signatures by simple attack. The attack strategies are described in detail and some discussions about the potential improvements of the protocols are given. Finally we also present several interesting topics in future study on AQS protocols.