How CEOs protect themselves against dismissal: A social status perspective
How CEOs protect themselves against dismissal: A social status perspective
复制标题
DOI：
10.1002/smj.2382
复制
发表时间：
2016-06
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Miriam Flickinger;Markus Wrage;Anja Tuschke;Rudi K. F. Bresser
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Miriam Flickinger;Markus Wrage;Anja Tuschke;Rudi K. F. Bresser
在这项研究中，我们探讨了为什么一些CEO在业绩下滑期间留任，而另一些CEO则没有。从社会地位的角度来看，我们认为一个人的董事会网络嵌入到外部董事的数量中，在解雇决定中发挥着重要作用。我们预测，首席执行官相对于董事会主席的较高地位可以保护表现不佳的首席执行官不被解雇，而董事会网络外部人士的相对显赫可以抵消这种影响。使用德国大型企业的纵向数据，我们找到了对我们预测的支持。
In this study, we address the question of why some CEOs stay in office during a performance downturn while others don't. Taking a social status perspective, we argue that an individual's board network embeddednessas reflected in the number of outside directorshipsplays an important role in dismissal decisions. We predict that a high status of the CEO relative to the chairman of the board protects an underperforming CEO against dismissal, while the relative salience of board network outsiders can counter this effect. Using longitudinal data of large German corporations, we find support for our predictions.