Institutional viability: a neo-Durkheimian theory
Institutional viability: a neo-Durkheimian theory
复制标题
制度可行性：新涂尔干理论
DOI：
10.1080/1351161032000163593
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发表时间：
2003
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Perri 6
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Perri 6
本文提出了一个条件下的制度，政策和安排可行的或可持续的，植根于新涂尔干传统的理论的声明。其论点是，当制度表现出基本制度形式的足够的内部多样性时，当这些形式之间的冲突可以被一种或多种类型的解决方案所遏制时，制度就有最大的生存机会。制度形式既受到正反馈或自我强化的影响，涂尔干传统认为这会导致组织解体，也会受到负反馈的影响，这会导致僵局和冲突，或者如果得到适当的控制，会导致解决。本文提供了一个分类的解决机构之间的必要性和讨论他们的优势和劣势的可用类型。
This article presents a statement of a theory of the conditions under which are institutions, policies and arrangements viable or sustainable, rooted in the neo-Durkheimian tradition. The argument is that institutions have the greatest chance of viability when they exhibit sufficient internal variety of the basic institutional forms, and when the conflicts between these forms can be contained by one or more types of settlements. Institutional forms are subject to both positive feedback or self-reinforcement, which the Durkheimian tradition argues can lead to disorganization, and to negative feedback dynamics which can lead either to gridlock and conflict or, if suitably contained, to settlement. The article offers a classification of the available types of settlement between institutional imperatives and a discussion of their strengths and weaknesses.