Equilibrium Binding Agreements
Equilibrium Binding Agreements
复制标题
平衡约束协议
DOI：
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发表时间：
1997
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
R. Vohra
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Debraj Ray;R. Vohra
摘要我们研究了均衡约束协议，在这种协议下形成的联盟结构，以及由此产生的结果的效率。我们分析这种协议的背景下，每个球员的回报取决于所有其他球员的行动。因此，战略形式的博弈是一个自然的起点。与特征函数的装置不同，当联盟阻止提议的协议时，明确关注互补的参与者集合的行为。一个解决方案的概念和它的应用进行了讨论。经济文献分类号：C70、C71。
Abstract We study equilibrium binding agreements, the coalition structures that form under such agreements, and the efficiency of the outcomes that result. We analyze such agreements in a context where the payoff to each player depends on the actions of all other players. Thus a game in strategic form is a natural starting point. Unlike the device of a characteristic function, explicit attention is paid to the behavior of the complementary set of players when a coalition blocks a proposed agreement. A solution concept and its applications are discussed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C71.