Endogenous environmental policy for small open economies with transboundary pollution
Endogenous environmental policy for small open economies with transboundary pollution
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DOI：
10.1016/j.econmod.2016.03.021
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发表时间：
2016-09-01
影响因子：
4.7
通讯作者：
Schulze, Guenther G.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Fuenfgelt, Joachim;Schulze, Guenther G.
我们分析了如果污染是跨境的并且国家太小而无法影响世界市场价格，那么政府如何制定环境政策。假设政府是自利的（而不是最大化社会福利），我们使用一个共同的代理框架来描述政治支持最大化政府的计算，这些政府发现自己处于由跨界污染造成的战略互动的境地。我们的模型显示了各国政府战略互动造成的扭曲如何与两国政治进程造成的扭曲相互作用。例如，强大的环境游说团体可以改善福利，因为它们可以抵消国际外部性造成的扭曲，但仅限于一定程度。我们没有像大多数文献那样假设内部解，而是证明角解是一种现实的可能性，并推导了它们发生的条件。此外，强烈的政治扭曲可能会造成不稳定，从而导致角落解决方案。 (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. 保留所有权利。
We analyze how governments set their environmental policies if pollution is transboundary and countries are too small to affect world market prices. Assuming that governments are self-interested (rather than maximizing social welfare) we use a common agency framework to portray the calculus of political support-maximizing governments that find themselves in a situation of strategic interaction created by transboundary pollution. Our model shows how distortions created by the strategic interaction of national governments interact with distortions that arise due to the political processes in both countries. For instance, strong environmental lobbies may improve welfare as they counteract the distortion caused by the international externality, yet only up to a point. Instead of assuming interior solutions as most of the literature does, we show that corner solutions are a realistic possibility and derive conditions under which they occur. Moreover strong political distortions may create instability and thus lead to corner solutions. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.