Cognitive Biases and the Strength of Political Arguments
Cognitive Biases and the Strength of Political Arguments
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00573.x
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发表时间：
2012-04-01
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
Arceneaux, Kevin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Arceneaux, Kevin
政治辩论中的竞争并不总是足以抵消政治言论对公众舆论的影响。然而，人们对影响政治论点说服力的因素知之甚少。在这篇文章中，我考虑了认知偏差是否会影响政治论点的感知强度，从而使一些论点比其他论点更有说服力。神经生物学和最近关于情绪的政治心理学研究得出的结论是，个人更有可能被通过恐惧反应引发损失厌恶的政治论点说服--即使面对相反的论点。来自两个实验的证据证实了这一预期。我考虑了这些实证结果的规范含义和未来研究的潜在途径。
Competition in political debate is not always sufficient to neutralize the effects of political rhetoric on public opinion. Yet little is known about the factors that shape the persuasiveness of political arguments. In this article, I consider whether cognitive biases influence the perceived strength of political arguments, making some arguments more persuasive than others. Lessons from neurobiology and recent political psychology research on emotion lead to the expectation that individuals are more likely to be persuaded by political arguments that evoke loss aversion via a fearful response-even in the face of a counterargument. Evidence from two experiments corroborates this expectation. I consider the normative implications of these empirical findings and potential avenues for future research.