The curse of low-valued recycling
The curse of low-valued recycling
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DOI：
10.1007/s11149-019-09378-9
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发表时间：
2019-03
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Hiroaki Ino;Norimichi Matsueda
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Hiroaki Ino;Norimichi Matsueda
本文讨论了如何处理低价值可回收废物，这些废物的后处理本身就没有经济效益。虽然这种回收活动可以潜在地改善社会福利，但如果与处置有关的社会成本足够大，政府促进回收的政策可能导致非法处置。明确考虑到防止企业非法处置收集的废物的监测成本，我们表明，对于低价值的可回收物，次优政策是以下两种方案之一：产生回收市场的押金退还方案（DRS）和不产生回收市场的高级处理费。然而，为了选择最优的政策方案并适当地实施，政策制定者需要只有在回收市场才能获得的信息。因此，次优政策的结构本身在其执行过程中涉及关键的信息问题，这与非低价值可回收物的DRS形成鲜明对比。
This paper discusses how to deal with low-valued recyclable wastes whose reprocessing itself does not pay financially. While such a recycling activity can potentially improve social welfare if the social costs associated with their disposal are sufficiently significant, governmental policies to promote recycling may lead to illegal disposal. Explicitly considering the monitoring cost in preventing firms from disposing of collected wastes illicitly, we show that the second-best policy for a low-valued recyclable is either one of the two following schemes: a deposit-refund scheme (DRS) that gives birth to a recycling market and an advanced-disposal fee that does not create a recycling market. However, in order to select the optimal policy scheme and implement it appropriately, a policymaker needs information available only in the recycling market. Thus, the structure of the second-best policy itself entails critical information issues in its implementation, which is in stark contrast to a DRS for a non-low-valued recyclable.