Patience or Fairness? Analyzing Social Preferences in Repeated Games
Patience or Fairness? Analyzing Social Preferences in Repeated Games
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耐心还是公平？
作者：
J. Duffy;Félix Muñoz
本文研究了社会偏好的引入如何影响一次性和无限重复版本的囚徒困境博弈中的博弈者的均衡行为。我们发现，公平的关注作为一个“替代品”的时间折扣在无限重复的游戏，公平有助于维持合作，较低的折扣因素。此外，如果玩家被告知彼此的社会偏好，比如果他们不知情，这样的合作可以支持更大的参数值。最后，我们的研究结果有助于确定条件下，在最近的实验重复游戏中观察到的合作行为可以合理化，单独使用时间偏好（耐心）或时间和社会偏好（公平）的组合。
This paper investigates how the introduction of social preferences affects players’ equilibrium behavior in both the one-shot and the infinitely repeated version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We show that fairness concerns operate as a ”substitute” for time discounting in the infinitely repeated game, as fairness helps sustain cooperation for lower discount factors. In addition, such cooperation can be supported under larger parameter values if players are informed about each others’ social preferences than if they are uninformed. Finally, our results help to identify conditions under which cooperative behavior observed in recent experimental repeated games can be rationalized using time preferences alone (patience) or a combination of time and social preferences (fairness).