HOTELLING'S “MAIN STREET” WITH MORE THAN TWO COMPETITORS*
HOTELLING'S “MAIN STREET” WITH MORE THAN TWO COMPETITORS*
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酒店林的“主街”有两个以上的竞争对手*
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-9787.1993.tb00228.x
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发表时间：
1993
影响因子：
3
通讯作者：
N. Economides
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
N. Economides
。我分析了位于霍特林(1929)主街的三家或更多公司之间的寡头垄断竞争，并表明与霍特林的双寡头垄断相比，对称的区位结构支持价格上的非合作均衡。然而，在第一阶段的区位选择和第二阶段的价格选择的两阶段博弈中，不存在服务于整个市场的子博弈完美均衡。这是因为，从任何区位模式开始，企业都有向中央企业转移的动机。这种最小差别原则的强势版本破坏了区位均衡的可能性。这些结果是位置空间中边界存在的直接结果。这些结果与标准圆形模型(其乘积空间没有边界)的结果之间的显著差异表明，通常使用圆形模型作为线距模型的近似可能是不必要的。
. I analyze oligopolistic competition among three or more firms located on Hotelling's (1929) Main Street and show that in contrast with Hotelling's duopoly, the symmetric locational structure supports a noncooperative equilibrium in prices. However, in a two-stage game of location choice in the first stage, and price choice in the second stage, there exists no subgame-perfect equilibrium where the whole market is served. This is because, starting from any locational pattern, firms have incentives to move toward the central firm. This strong version of the Principle of Minimum Differentiation destroys the possibility of a locational equilibrium. The results are a direct consequence of the existence of boundaries in the space of location. The sharp difference between these results and those of the standard circular model (whose product space lacks boundaries) shows that the general use of the circular model as an approximation to the line interval model may be unwarranted.