Optimal impartial selection
Optimal impartial selection
复制标题
最优公正选择
DOI：
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Max Klimm
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Felix A. Fischer;Max Klimm
我们研究的问题，选择一个成员的一组代理商的基础上公正提名的代理商从该集合。这个问题之前由Alon等人和Holzman和Moulin进行了研究，并且在从一个组中选择代表或基于同行评审过程做出出版或资助决策的情况下具有重要的应用。我们的主要结果涉及一个随机机制，在预期中选择一个代理至少有一半的最大提名数。在公正的前提下，这是最好的办法。
We study the problem of selecting a member of a set of agents based on impartial nominations by agents from that set. The problem was studied previously by Alon et al. and by Holzman and Moulin and has important applications in situations where representatives are selected from within a group or where publishing or funding decisions are made based on a process of peer review. Our main result concerns a randomized mechanism that in expectation selects an agent with at least half the maximum number of nominations. Subject to impartiality, this is best possible.