Abductive inference and delusional belief
Abductive inference and delusional belief
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DOI：
10.1080/13546800903439120
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发表时间：
2010-01-01
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Sutton, John
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Coltheart, Max;Menzies, Peter;Sutton, John
抽象信念有时被认为是从异常经验中得出的理性推论。我们更详细地探讨这个想法，提出以下几点。首先，最初促使妄想信念娱乐化的认知异常并不总是有意识的，因为我们更愿意将“经验”一词限制在意识范围内，所以我们指的是“异常数据”而不是“异常经验”。其次，我们认为，在许多妄想（我们考虑七个）中，人们可以清楚地识别出是什么异常的认知数据促使了妄想，以及是什么神经心理障碍导致了这些数据的发生;但是，人们同样可以清楚地指出，这种障碍存在，而妄想却不存在。因此，这种损害不足以导致妄想的发生：第二种认知损害，即影响评估信念的能力，也必须存在。第三（这也是本文的主旨），我们详细考虑了从异常数据到信念的推理的本质是什么。这不是演绎推理，也不是枚举归纳推理;这是溯因推理。我们提供了一个贝叶斯帐户的溯因推理，并将其应用到妄想信念的解释。
Delusional beliefs have sometimes been considered as rational inferences from abnormal experiences. We explore this idea in more detail, making the following points. First, the abnormalities of cognition that initially prompt the entertaining of a delusional belief are not always conscious and since we prefer to restrict the term "experience" to consciousness we refer to "abnormal data" rather than "abnormal experience". Second, we argue that in relation to many delusions (we consider seven) one can clearly identify what the abnormal cognitive data are which prompted the delusion and what the neuropsychological impairment is which is responsible for the occurrence of these data; but one can equally clearly point to cases where this impairment is present but delusion is not. So the impairment is not sufficient for delusion to occur: a second cognitive impairment, one that affects the ability to evaluate beliefs, must also be present. Third (and this is the main thrust of our paper), we consider in detail what the nature of the inference is that leads from the abnormal data to the belief. This is not deductive inference and it is not inference by enumerative induction; it is abductive inference. We offer a Bayesian account of abductive inference and apply it to the explanation of delusional belief.