The Design of Optimal Education Policies
The Design of Optimal Education Policies
复制标题
最优教育政策的设计
DOI：
10.1111/1467-937x.00212
复制
发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
G. Fraja
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
G. Fraja
本文研究的是一个不受约束的功利主义政府的最优教育政策。家庭的收入和子女的智力水平各不相同;收入由政府观察，但能力是私人信息。家庭可以选择接受私立教育，但不能通过借贷来资助，我们得到的结果是惊人的。最优的教育政策是精英主义的：与私人提供和第一最佳政策相比，它增加了聪明孩子和不太聪明孩子之间的教育成就差距。此外，儿童所受的教育也取决于父母的收入，除非他们聪明。最后，最优的教育政策是投入递减的，在阿罗（1971）的意义上：收入较高和孩子聪明的家庭对教育系统成本的贡献低于收入较低和孩子不聪明的家庭。
The paper studies the optimal education policy of a budget-constrained utilitarian government. Households differ in their income and in the intellectual ability of their children; income is observed by the government, but ability is private information. Households can choose to use private education, but cannot borrow to finance it. The results we obtain are striking. The optimal education policy is elitist: it increases the spread between the education achievement of the bright and the less bright children, compared to both private provision and the first-best policy. It is also such that the education received by a child depends positively on their parental income, unless they are bright. Finally, the optimal education policy is input regressive, in the sense of Arrow (1971): households with higher income and brighter children contribute less towards the cost of the education system than households with lower income and less bright children.
影响因子：
6.1
作者：
HART, O;MOORE, J
通讯作者：
MOORE, J