Fooling All of the People Some of the Time: A Theory of Endogenous Sequencing in Confidential Negotiations
Fooling All of the People Some of the Time: A Theory of Endogenous Sequencing in Confidential Negotiations
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有时愚弄所有人：机密谈判中的内生排序理论
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.79934
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发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
T. Noe
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jun Wang;T. Noe
我们分析了一个讨价还价的游戏，其中一方，称为买方，有选择的谈判顺序与其他参与者，称为卖方的选项。当谈判的顺序是保密的，卖方的货物是高度互补的，有效的，非耗散均衡存在，其中买方随机谈判序列。在这些均衡中，买方可以获得比纯策略均衡或公共谈判更高的支付。使买方支付最大化的排序不确定性的程度与卖方的总议价能力成反比。
We analyse a bargaining game in which one party, called the buyer, has the option of choosing the sequence of negotiations with other participants, called sellers. When the sequencing of negotiations is confidential and the sellers' goods are highly complementary, efficient, non-dissipative equilibria exist in which the buyer randomizes over negotiation sequences. In these equilibria, the buyer can obtain higher pay-offs than in pure strategy equilibria or in public negotiations. The degree of sequencing uncertainty that maximizes buyer pay-offs is inversely related to the aggregate bargaining power of the sellers.