Human Capital Investment, Credentialing, and Wage Differentials
Human Capital Investment, Credentialing, and Wage Differentials
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人力资本投资、资格认证和工资差异
DOI：
10.1111/jpet.12443
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发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Masashi Tanaka
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ishikawa H;Otsuka S;Nakagawa S;Yuta Saito and Jun Sakamoto;Masashi Tanaka
这项研究考虑了个人如何决定他们将投资于两种不同类型的教育的比例。第一种类型有助于劳动技能的发展，而另一种则没有。我们把前者称为人力资本投资，后者称为非生产性投资，它提高了考试成绩，但对学生的人力资本没有任何有益的影响。我们制定了一个世代重叠的经济，其中富人和穷人家庭投资于两种类型的教育。我们发现，在工资差距处于中等水平的经济体中，人力资本投资占非生产性投资的比例较低。在动态分析中，我们确定了工资差异动态的两种稳定稳态模式，即无不平等稳态和高度不平等稳态。此外，我们表明，技能偏向技术水平的快速增长可能会导致从没有不平等的稳定状态转变为高度不平等的状态。在向新的稳定状态过渡的过程中，这至少会导致非生产性投资的比例暂时增加。
This study considers how individuals determine at what ratio they will invest in two different types of education. The first type contributes to the development of labor skills, while the other does not. We refer to the former as human capital investment and the latter as unproductive investment, which improves test scores but has no beneficial effect on students' human capital. We formulate an overlapping‐generations economy in which the rich and poor households invest in both types of education. We find that the ratio of human capital investment to unproductive investment is lower in the economy with medium size of the wage differentials. In a dynamic analysis, we identify two patterns of stable steady states for the dynamics of the wage differentials, namely, no‐inequality and high‐inequality steady states. Further, we show that a rapid increase in the level of skill‐biased technology may cause a switch from a steady state with no‐inequality to one with high inequality. This causes at least a temporary increase in the ratio of unproductive investment during the transition to the new steady state.