A POLITICAL THEORY OF POPULISM
A POLITICAL THEORY OF POPULISM
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DOI：
10.1093/qje/qjs077
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发表时间：
2013-05-01
影响因子：
13.7
通讯作者：
Sonin, Konstantin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Acemoglu, Daron;Egorov, Georgy;Sonin, Konstantin
当选民担心政治家可能受到富有精英的影响或腐败时，诚信的信号就很有价值。因此，一个寻求连任的诚实的政治家选择“民粹主义”政策也就是中间选民的左翼政策作为一种信号，表明他不受右翼利益的影响。受右翼特殊利益集团影响的政治家会选择温和甚至中间偏左的政策。当政治家留任的价值更高时，这种政策的民粹主义偏见就更大;当中间选民和右翼特殊利益集团的政策偏好之间存在更大的两极分化时;当政治家被认为更有可能腐败时;当选民收到的信息中存在中等数量的噪音时;当政治家更具前瞻性时;当政治家被认为更有可能腐败时，政治家的政策倾向就更大。以及现任者的类型存在较大不确定性的时候。我们还表明，软期限限制可能会加剧，而不是减少，政策的民粹主义偏见。JEL代码：D 71，D 74。
When voters fear that politicians may be influenced or corrupted by the rich elite, signals of integrity are valuable. As a consequence, an honest politician seeking reelection chooses "populist" policies-that is, policies to the left of the median voter-as a way of signaling that he is not beholden to the interests of the right. Politicians that are influenced by right-wing special interests respond by choosing moderate or even left-of-center policies. This populist bias of policy is greater when the value of remaining in office is higher for the politician; when there is greater polarization between the policy preferences of the median voter and right-wing special interests; when politicians are perceived as more likely to be corrupt; when there is an intermediate amount of noise in the information that voters receive; when politicians are more forward-looking; and when there is greater uncertainty about the type of the incumbent. We also show that soft term limits may exacerbate, rather than reduce, the populist bias of policies. JEL Codes: D71, D74.