Feasibility of Cross-Chain Payment with Success Guarantees
Feasibility of Cross-Chain Payment with Success Guarantees
复制标题
跨链支付的可行性并保证成功
DOI：
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发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Pierre Tholoniat
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. V. Glabbeek;Vincent Gramoli;Pierre Tholoniat
我们考虑跨链支付的问题，即不同托管的客户（由银行或区块链智能合约实现）在彼此不信任的情况下成功转移数字资产。在这项工作之前，跨链支付问题不需要这种成功，或任何形式的进展。我们证明，在假设同步的情况下可以解决这个问题，即保证每条消息在已知的时间内到达，但如果不假设同步则无法解决。然而，我们解决了这个问题的一个较弱的变体，其中成功取决于参与者的耐心，不假设同步，并且存在拜占庭失败。我们还讨论了与最近定义的跨链交易的关系。
We consider the problem of cross-chain payment whereby customers of different escrows---implemented by a bank or a blockchain smart contract---successfully transfer digital assets without trusting each other. Prior to this work, cross-chain payment problems did not require this success, or any form of progress. We demonstrate that it is possible to solve this problem when assuming synchrony, in the sense that each message is guaranteed to arrive within a known amount of time, but impossible to solve without assuming synchrony. Yet, we solve a weaker variant of this problem, where success is conditional on the patience of the participants, without assuming synchrony, and in the presence of Byzantine failures. We also discuss the relation with the recently defined cross-chain deals.