Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles
Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles
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内幕交易和信托原则的逐渐消亡
DOI：
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Donna M. Nagy
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Donna M. Nagy
SEC最近的执法行动，比如对达拉斯小牛队老板马克·库班提起的诉讼，提出了一个问题，即受托人的欺骗行为是否是10 b-5条内幕交易罪的关键。根据最高法院的经典和挪用理论，答案显然是肯定的-每一个理论都有一个信托原则的核心。然而，下级法院和证券交易委员会经常无视最高法院的明确规定，一种共识正在形成，即内幕交易仅仅是错误地使用重要的非公开信息，而不管是否违反了类似受托人的义务。虽然这种内幕交易的观点可以通过最高法院在美国诉奥黑根案中的裁决所依据的政策目标来证明，但它目前缺乏坚实的理论基础。为了解决这一异常现象，本文提出了具体建议，这些建议将为内幕交易法带来急需的一致性和合法性。
Recent SEC enforcement actions, such as the case filed against Dallas Mavericks' owner Mark Cuban, raise the question whether deception by a fiduciary is essential to the Rule 10b-5 insider trading offense. Under the Supreme Court's classical and misappropriation theories, the answer is clearly yes - each theory has a fiduciary principle at its core. Yet lower courts and the SEC frequently disregard the Court's explicit dictates, and a consensus is emerging that insider trading rests simply on the wrongful use of material nonpublic information, regardless of whether a fiduciary-like duty is breached. Although this view of insider trading can be justified by the policy objectives underlying the Court's decision in United States v. O'Hagan, it currently lacks a solid doctrinal foundation. To resolve this anomaly, this Article offers specific suggestions that would bring much needed coherence and legitimacy to the law of insider trading.