Versioning Information Goods
Versioning Information Goods
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发表时间：
2000
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通讯作者：
Paul Belleflamme
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作者：
Paul Belleflamme
信息产品的一个突出特点是，它们具有较大的固定生产成本和较小的复制变动成本。在这种情况下，基于成本的定价没有什么意义；基于价值的定价要合适得多。不同的消费者对于特定的信息商品可能有截然不同的价值，因此差异定价技术变得非常重要。差别定价有多种形式；最近的一项调查可以在瓦里安[1989]找到。在本文中，我们将重点讨论差异定价的一个特定方面，即质量歧视或版本控制。这些术语描述生产者以不同的价格提供不同质量/版本的商品的情况。正如我们将在下面看到的，版本化的要点是让消费者根据他们的支付意愿将自己分类到不同的组中。支付意愿高的消费者选择一个版本，而支付意愿较低的消费者选择不同的版本。制片人选择版本，以引导消费者“自我选择”到合适的类别。
One prominent feature of information goods is that they have large fixed costs of production, and small variable costs of reproduction. Cost-based pricing makes little sense in this context; value-based pricing is much more appropriate. Different consumers may have radically different values for a particular information good, so techniques for differential pricing become very important. There are many forms of differential pricing; a recent survey can be found in Varian [1989]. In this paper we will focus on a particular aspect of differential pricing known as quality discrimination or versioning. These terms describe situations in which the producer provides different qualities/versions of a good which sell at different prices. As we will see below, the point of versioning is to get the consumers to sort themselves into different groups according to their willingness to pay. Consumers with high willingness to pay choose one version, while consumers with lower willingnesses to pay choose a different version. The producer chooses the versions so as to induce the consumers to “self select” into appropriate categories.