Intergovernmental Fiscal Relationships in China: A Simple Model Based on the Nonsymmetric Nash Solution
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relationships in China: A Simple Model Based on the Nonsymmetric Nash Solution
复制标题
中国政府间财政关系：基于非对称纳什解的简单模型
DOI：
10.1007/s41685-017-0040-6
复制
发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
1.4
通讯作者：
Mototsugu Fukushige and Yingxin Shi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Chen;C.-W.;Oguchi;T.;Mototsugu Fukushige and Yingxin Shi
本文提出了一种新的财政分权的实证分析方法，并将其应用于中国中央政府与省级政府之间的政府间财政关系，使用非对称纳什解。在计算预算收入和支出份额时，我们把预算外收入和支出都包括在内。我们发现，虽然收入不平等或真实的人均GDP的增加降低了地方政府在预算体系内的议价能力，但地方政府可以通过获得更多的预算外支出议价能力来抵消这一影响。另一个发现是，虽然城市化增加了省级政府的预算收入，但也限制了进一步预算支出的范围。
We propose a new empirical approach to analyze fiscal decentralization and apply it to Chinese intergovernmental fiscal relationships between the central government and provincial governments, using nonsymmetric Nash solution. In calculating budgetary revenue and expenditure shares, we include extra budgetary revenue and expenditure. We find that although an increase in either income inequality or real per capita GDP lowers local governments’ bargaining power within the budgetary system, local governments can offset this by obtaining more bargaining power over extra budgetary expenditures. Another finding is that although urbanization increases provincial governments’ budgetary revenues, it also restricts the scope for further budgetary expenditure.