ON A CONFUSION ABOUT A FUNCTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS
ON A CONFUSION ABOUT A FUNCTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS
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DOI：
10.1017/s0140525x00038188
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发表时间：
1995-06-01
影响因子：
29.3
通讯作者：
BLOCK, N
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
BLOCK, N
意识是一个混杂的概念：有许多非常不同的“意识”。“现象意识是经验；一种状态的现象意识方面是处于这种状态的感觉。相比之下，无障碍意识的标志是可以用于推理和理性地指导言语和行为。这些概念经常部分或完全混为一谈，结果很糟糕。本文以基于盲视现象的“意识”功能的推理形式为例。盲区刺激的一些信息在盲视患者的大脑中表现出来，正如他们正确的“猜测”所显示的那样。然而，他们不能利用这些信息来为行动服务，据说这表明，现象意识的一个功能是以某种方式使大脑中呈现的信息指导行动。但是盲区中的刺激既是接近无意识的，也是现象无意识的。谬误在于：接近意识机制的一个明显功能被非法地转移到现象意识上。
Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different ''consciousnesses.'' Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often partly or totally conflated, with bad results. This target article uses as an example a form of reasoning about a function of ''consciousness'' based on the phenomenon of blindsight. Some information about stimuli in the blind field is represented in the brains of blindsight patients, as shown by their correct ''guesses.'' They cannot harness this information in the service of action, however, and this is said to show that a function of phenomenal consciousness is somehow to enable information represented in the brain to guide action. But stimuli in the blind field are both access-unconscious and phenomenally unconscious. The fallacy is: an obvious function of the machinery of access-consciousness is illicitly transferred to phenomenal consciousness.