Ownership Structure, Banks and Private Benefits of Control
Ownership Structure, Banks and Private Benefits of Control
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所有权结构、银行和私人控制权利益
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.255968
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发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
P. Volpin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
P. Volpin
什么因素影响公司选择向多少家银行借款？本文提供了各国股东保护与公司使用的平均银行数量之间负相关的证据，并对这一结果提出了一个简单的解释。该模型的直觉是，建立更少的银行关系，会促使控股股东从控制权中获取更多的私人利益，因为银行通过赚取更高的租金，分担了更大比例的成本。由于在股东保护程度较低的国家，享受私人控制权利益的机会更大，因此该模型预测，在这些国家，银行关系会更多（所有权集中度更高）。与该模型的预测一致，在意大利，每家公司的银行关系数量随着公司所有权集中度和由投票溢价衡量的私人控制利益的大小而增加。
What affects the number of banks a company chooses to borrow from? This paper provides evidence of a negative correlation across countries between shareholder protection and average number of banks used by firms, and proposes a simple explanation for this result. The intuition of the model is that setting up fewer bank relations induces the controlling shareholder to extract more private benefits of control because the banks share a larger fraction of the costs via the larger rent they earn. Since the opportunity to enjoy private benefits of control is larger in countries with lower shareholder protection, the model predicts more bank relationships (and higher ownership concentration) in those countries. Consistent with the model's predictions, in Italy the number of bank relations per firm increases with firm ownership concentration and with the size of the private benefits of control as measured by the voting premium.
公共债务和私人债务的选择：日本放松管制后的企业融资分析
DOI：
--
发表时间：
1993
期刊：
影响因子：
--
作者：
T. Hoshi;A. Kashyap;D. Scharfstein
通讯作者：
D. Scharfstein