Habit: Time, Freedom, Governance
Habit: Time, Freedom, Governance
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习惯：时间、自由、治理
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
T. Bennett
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
T. Bennett
本文探讨了习惯在不同的“人的结构”中所占据的位置，特别关注习惯与以时间为标志的人格其他组成部分之间的关系。三个这样的立场进行审查：第一，思想，意志，记忆，习惯和本能之间的关系提出的后达尔文帐户的“有机记忆”;第二，亨利柏格森的帐户之间的关系的习惯，记忆和成为;和，第三，时间方面的皮埃尔布迪厄的概念惯习理解为一套遗传的倾向。这些不同的"人的架构"被认为是关于他们雅阁习惯在跨代继承机制中的角色;他们提出的体现人格的历史化形式;以及他们解释自由能力的出现的方式，这种自由能力可以（部分）抵消继承的过去的重量。有人认为，将这种能力归于某些形式的人格，而不是其他形式的人格，既是由自由形式的政府形成的，也是为自由形式的政府提供条件的。那些表现出这种自由能力的人的行为是如何在各种“自由权威”的指导下进行的，这一点得到了特别的考虑。
This article investigates the place that habit occupies in different ‘architectures of the person’, focusing particularly on constructions of the relations between habit and other components of personhood that are marked by time. Three such positions are examined: first, the relations between thought, will, memory, habit and instinct proposed by post-Darwinian accounts of ‘organic memory’; second, Henri Bergson’s account of the relations between habit, memory and becoming; and, third, the temporal aspects of Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus understood as a set of hereditable dispositions. These different ‘architectures of the person’ are considered with regard to the role they accord habit in trans-generational mechanisms of inheritance; the historicised forms of embodied personhood that they propose; and the manner in which they account for the emergence of a capacity for freedom that can (partially) offset the weight of the inherited past. It is argued that the imputation of such a capacity to some forms of personhood, but not others, is both shaped by and provides the conditions for the operation of liberal forms of government. The manner in which the conduct of those who exhibit such a capacity for freedom is brought under the direction of varied ‘authorities of freedom’ is given particular consideration.