Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms
Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms
复制标题
明显的策略证明机制的概率验证
DOI：
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Carmine Ventre
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Diodato Ferraioli;Carmine Ventre
显然，策略证明（OSP）机制维持了不完全理性的行为体的激励相容性。自它们最近的定义以来，它们一直是许多研究的对象。在[Ferraioli and Ventre， 2017]中发起的一项研究议程是找到一小组（可能是最小的）允许实施OSP机制的条件。为此，我们定义了一个概率验证模型，其中代理以一定的概率被发现行为不正常，并展示了OSP机制如何以施加非常大的罚款或验证线性数量的代理为代价实现每个社会选择函数。
Obviously strategyproof (OSP) mechanisms maintain the incentive compatibility of agents that are not fully rational. They have been object of a number of studies since their recent definition. A research agenda, initiated in [Ferraioli and Ventre, 2017], is to find a small set (possibly, the smallest) of conditions allowing to implement an OSP mechanism. To this aim, we define a model of probabilistic verification wherein agents are caught misbehaving with a certain probability, and show how OSP mechanisms can implement every social choice function at the cost of either imposing very large fines or verifying a linear number of agents.