Experimentalist governance with interactive central-local relations: making new pension policies in China
Experimentalist governance with interactive central-local relations: making new pension policies in China
复制标题
中央与地方互动关系的实验主义治理：中国新养老金政策的制定
DOI：
10.1111/psj.12254
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发表时间：
--
影响因子：
3.8
通讯作者：
Hui Zhao
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Xufeng Zhu;Hui Zhao
尽管区域政策实验已成为一种全球趋势，但在特定国家（如中国），实验主义治理的显著特征仍有待研究。本文扩展了政策过程理论，提出了具有中央-地方互动关系的实验主义治理框架或中国式实验主义治理框架，该框架具有三个特征。第一，政策目标和政策工具由中央和地方政府分别和互动形成。第二，中央政府为了维护权威和合法性，对政策绩效的担忧也是沉重的负担。第三，政策试点的评估主要依赖于地方政府的回应。我们进一步概念化了中国实验主义治理的三种新模式，即“比较试验”、“选择性承认”和“适应性和解”，以及“层级实验”。这些模式通过对中国公共部门员工、城镇员工、农村居民和农民工四项养老金政策的案例研究来说明。
Although regional policy experimentation has become a global trend, the distinct features of experimentalist governance in a given country, such as China, remains to be investigated. This article extends policy process theory by proposing the framework of experimentalist governance with interactive central–local relations or Chinese‐style experimentalist governance, which combines three features. First, policy goals and instruments are formed separately and interactively by the central and local governments. Second, the central government is burdened with its own concerns about policy performance for maintaining authority and legitimacy. Third, the evaluation of policy pilots relies primarily on the responses of local governments. We further conceptualize three new patterns of experimentalist governance in China, namely, “comparative trial,” “selective recognition,” and “adaptive reconciliation,” in addition to “hierarchical experimentation.” These patterns are illustrated with case studies on four pension policies in China, which are for public sector employees, urban employees, rural residents, and migrant workers.