Equilibrium Income Inequality among Identical Agents
Equilibrium Income Inequality among Identical Agents
复制标题
相同代理人之间的均衡收入不平等
DOI：
10.1086/262051
复制
发表时间：
1996
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
Scott J Freeman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Scott J Freeman
这篇论文提出了一种收入差异理论，在这种理论中，尽管品味和才能相同，但收入不平等仍然存在并持续存在。在受过教育的经理的监督下，非熟练劳动力团队生产的产品按规模回报不断增加。代理人被假定无法借钱为成为管理者所需的人力资本投资提供资金。尽管事前相同的代理人，该模型显示了以下均衡现象：(i)风险厌恶的代理人接受公平的赌博，这意味着事后分配的不平等的非劳动收入；（二）代理人同意公共资助教育，尽管接受资助的人物质财富最高；（三）收入和受教育程度的差异代代相传。
The paper offers a theory of income differences in which income inequality exists and persists despite identical tastes and talents. Teams of unskilled labor supervised by schooled managers produce goods with increasing returns to scale. Agents are assumed unable to borrow to fund the human capital investment needed to become managers. Despite ex ante identical agents, the model displays the following equilibrium phenomena: (i) risk-averse agents accept fair gambles, implying an unequal ex post distribution of unearned income; (ii) agents agree to publicly subsidize education, although those receiving the subsidy have the highest material wealth; and (iii) income and educational differences are perpetuated from generation to generation.