Equilibrium and Inefficiency in a Community Model With Peer Group Effects
Equilibrium and Inefficiency in a Community Model With Peer Group Effects
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具有同侪群体效应的社区模型中的均衡和低效率
DOI：
10.1086/261671
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发表时间：
1990
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
C. D. Bartolome
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
C. D. Bartolome
公共服务的产出取决于投入支出、个人特征和社区其他居民的特征（同伴群体效应）。在一个社区模型中，公共支出由投票决定，社区之间的迁移，土地价格差异（资本化），它表明，社区可能会成为异质性的组成和（次佳）效率低下。这种均衡发生在同伴群体效应既不“太强”也不“太弱”的时候。“效率低下是因为移徙造成了外部性。土地价格的差异并不起着较好的同类群体的“价格”的作用，而是一种转移支付。
Public-service output depends on input expenditures, on own personal characteristics, and on the characteristics of the other residents in the community (the peer group effect). In a community model with public expenditures set by voting, with migration between communities, and with land price differentials (capitalization), it is shown that communities may become heterogeneous in composition and (second-best) inefficient. This equilibrium occurs when the peer group effect is neither "too strong" nor "too weak." The inefficiency arises because an externality is created by migration. The land price differential does not play the part of the "price" of the better peer group but of a transfer payment.