Cross-referenced body and action for the unified self: Empirical, developmental, and clinical perspectives

Cross-referenced body and action for the unified self: Empirical, developmental, and clinical perspectives
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统一自我的交叉参考身体和行动:经验、发展和临床观点

DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198851721.003.0012
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发表时间:
2021
期刊:
Body schema and body image: New directions
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
M.
M.
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Imaizumi;S.;Asai;T.;& Miyazaki;M.

文献摘要

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为了与环境和他人互动,我们拥有身体,通过它我们执行行动。身体的心理表征是身体与外部世界之间的接口,包括两个不同的方面:身体意象和身体图式。身体意象是指我们通过知觉经验和概念理解对身体的有意识的形象,而身体图式是指通过协调身体部位来实现运动动作和姿势控制的无意识系统(Gallagher,2005; Gallagher &科尔,1995)。我们必须意识到我们的身体和它的行动,以区别于环境和外部代理人。因此,自我意识或自我表征可以在大脑中由身体表征引导和/或与身体表征相关地产生。自我表征也有独特的(但互动的)组成部分:身体所有权的感觉,一种对身体部位的自我归属感,以及代理,一种发起和控制自己行动的感觉(Gallagher,2000; 2005)。因此,可以假设身体是感知和概念身体体验(即身体意象)的无所不在的来源,并且可以产生身体所有权感。此外,运动动作隐含地受到身体图式的指导,因此,可以产生对这些动作的代理感。本章将讨论我们的自我表征如何通过我们的身体(身体意象的来源)和身体行动(身体图式的来源)出现。讨论是基于健康和精神病成年人的经验文献,并进一步试图说明的出现,损失,和重新出现的自我代表整合从幼儿和成年截肢者的研究结果。
To interact with the environment and others, we possess the body, through which we perform actions. The mental representation of the body acts as an interface between our body and the external world and consists of two distinctive aspects: body image and body schema. Body image refers to our conscious image of the body through perceptual experience and conceptual understanding, whereas body schema refers to unconscious systems that enable motor actions and postural control by coordinating body parts (Gallagher, 2005; Gallagher & Cole, 1995). We must be aware of our body and its actions to distinguish ourselves from the environment and external agents. As such, self-consciousness or self-representation could be generated in the brain led by, and/or correlating with, body representation. Self-representation also has distinctive (but interactive) components: the senses of body ownership, a feeling of self-attribution of one’s body parts, and agency, a feeling of initiating and controlling one’s actions (Gallagher, 2000; 2005). Therefore, it can be assumed that the body is an omnipresent source of perceptual and conceptual bodily experience (ie, body image) and can generate a sense of body ownership. Moreover, motor actions are implicitly guided by body schema and, consequently, can generate a sense of agency over these actions. This chapter will discuss how our self-representation emerges through our body, which is a source of body image, and through bodily action, which originates from body schema. The discussion is based on empirical literature on healthy and psychiatric adults and furthermore attempts to illustrate the emergence, loss, and re-emergence of self-representation by integrating findings from young children and adult amputees.