Strategic Manipulation in Voting Games When Lotteries and Ties Are Permitted
Strategic Manipulation in Voting Games When Lotteries and Ties Are Permitted
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允许抽签和平局时投票游戏的战略操纵
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.2001.2794
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发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Benoît
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Benoît
摘要建立了随机决策规则和允许联系的规则的Gibbard-Satterthwaite型定理。这些规则使用了个人如何对彩票和结果进行排序的完整信息。该定理允许对排名域进行限制。经济文献分类号：D7， C7。
Abstract A Gibbard–Satterthwaite type theorem is established for random decision rules and rules that permit ties. The rules use full information on how individuals rank lotteries and sets of outcomes. The theorem allows restrictions on the domain of rankings. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D7, C7.