Sustainable Transmission Planning in Imperfectly Competitive Electricity Industries: Balancing Economic Efficiency and Environmental Outcomes
Sustainable Transmission Planning in Imperfectly Competitive Electricity Industries: Balancing Economic Efficiency and Environmental Outcomes
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不完全竞争电力行业的可持续输电规划：平衡经济效率和环境成果
DOI：
10.1016/j.ejor.2018.11.032
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发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
6.4
通讯作者：
Yihsu Chen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Afzal S. Siddiqui;Makoto Tanaka;Yihsu Chen
我们探讨了输电系统运营商（TSO）在建设可再生能源输电线路以降低政府政策要求的排放方面的作用。与中央计划相反，在放松管制的电力行业中，TSO只能通过选择输电线路容量间接影响结果。通过一个双层模型，我们表明，在一个完全竞争的行业中，这导致了更少的传输容量和有限的排放控制（-à-visa基准中央计划系统）。只有在完全竞争的情况下，对工业征收充分考虑污染损害成本的碳税，才能实现激励与社会福利最大化的完美结合。相比之下，在古诺寡头垄断下，碳税实际上可能会降低社会福利，因为由此导致的消费减少有利于进一步行使市场力量。
We explore the role of a transmission system operator (TSO) that builds a transmission line to accommodate renewable energy in order to lower emissions as required by government policy. In contrast to central planning, a TSO in a deregulated electricity industry can only indirectly influence outcomes through its choice of the transmission line capacity. Via a bi-level model, we show that this results in less transmission capacity and with limited emissions control in a perfectly competitive industryvis-à-visa benchmark centrally planned system. A carbon charge on industry that fully accounts for the cost of pollution damage leads to a perfect alignment of incentives and maximised social welfare only under perfect competition. By contrast, a carbon charge may actually lower social welfare under a Cournot oligopoly as the resulting reduction in consumption facilitates the further exercise of market power.