Robustly Ranking Mechanisms
Robustly Ranking Mechanisms
复制标题
强大的排名机制
DOI：
10.1257/aer.102.3.325
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Doug Smith
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
T. Börgers;Doug Smith
对于一个机制设计者的目标，如福利，我们提出了一种方法，鲁棒排名机制。该方法是基于消除弱劣势策略，因此不需要任何假设代理人的信念，除了完全支持。我们用两个例子说明了这种方法的实用性：双边贸易和投票。在这两个例子中，我们表明，有我们的方法排名高于主导策略机制的机制。这些例子质疑文献的重点占主导地位的战略机制的情况下，这种机制产生不良的结果。
For a mechanism designer with an objective such as welfare we propose a method for robustly ranking mechanisms. The method is based on eliminating weakly dominated strategies only, and thus does not require any assumptions about agents' beliefs about each other except full support. We illustrate the usefulness of this method in two examples: bilateral trading and voting. In both examples we show that there are mechanisms that are ranked by our method above dominant strategy mechanisms. These examples question the literature's focus on dominant strategy mechanisms in cases when such mechanisms yield undesirable outcomes.