The Political Economy of Beliefs: Why Fiscal and Social Conservatives/Liberals Come Hand-in-hand
The Political Economy of Beliefs: Why Fiscal and Social Conservatives/Liberals Come Hand-in-hand
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信仰的政治经济学：为什么财政和社会保守派/自由派齐头并进
DOI：
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Lind
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Daniel L. Chen;J. Lind
为什么宗教团体与更多的内部慈善捐赠更社会保守和反对福利国家？我们提出并测试了一个理论，宗教提供的社会保险解释了为什么财政和社会保守主义对齐。当有一个国家教会时，联盟消失，而国家教会的成员则相反。这种逆转不太可能是由被忽略的环境变量驱动的：在财政和社会保守主义之间的一致性增加之前，教会-国家分离的外源性增加。这一理论为宗教历史提供了一种新颖的解释：随着精英们获得替代性社会保险，他们裁定增加政教分离，以创造一个低税收的选区。如果有宗教信仰的选民超过无宗教信仰的选民，这一点就成立，否则，精英们更喜欢减少政教分离，以遏制世俗左派，产生多个稳定状态，其中一些国家维持高度政教分离，高度宗教信仰和低福利国家，反之亦然。我们使用这个框架来解释宗教运动的变化性质，从社会福音到宗教权利，以及为什么教会国家分离出现在美国，而不是在许多欧洲国家。
Why are religious groups with greater within-group charitable giving more socially conservative and opposed to the welfare state? We propose and test a theory where religious provision of social insurance explains why fiscal and social conservatism align. The alignment disappears when there is a state church and reverses for members of a state church. This reversal is unlikely to be driven by omitted environmental variables: exogenous increases in church-state separation precede increases in the alignment between fiscal and social conservatism. The theory provides a novel explanation for religious history: as elites gain access to alternative social insurance, they judiciate increasing church-state separation to create a constituency for lower taxes. This holds if religious voters exceed non-religious voters, otherwise, elites prefer less church-state separation in order to curb the secular left, generating multiple steady states where some countries sustain high church-state separation, high religiosity, and low welfare state, and vice versa. We use this framework to explain the changing nature of religious movements, from Social Gospel to the Religious Right, and why church-state separation arose in the U.S. but not in many European countries.