Electoral Handouts as Information: Explaining Unmonitored Vote Buying
Electoral Handouts as Information: Explaining Unmonitored Vote Buying
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作为信息的选举讲义：解释不受监控的买票行为
DOI：
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Eric Kramon
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Eric Kramon
翻译后摘要：为什么是有效的选票购买，即使在选票保密保护？大多数答案都来自机器政治的模型，在这种模型中，机器让接受施舍的人对他们随后的政治行为负责。然而，在许多没有政党机器的情况下，或者在政党很少努力监督选民的情况下，买票是很常见的。这篇文章解决了这个难题。作者认为，政客们经常分发选举传单，向选民传达信息。这种购买选票的行为传递了有关未来向穷人提供资源的信息。作者用在肯尼亚收集的原始定性和实验数据来检验这一论点。选民关于候选人买票的信息导致选举支持大幅增加，这是由对选举期后提供客户利益的期望所驱动的。结果表明，物质利益的分配可以是有说服力的原因，从而解释如何购买选票可以在没有机器政治的情况下是有效的。
Abstract:Why is vote buying effective even where ballot secrecy is protected? Most answers emerge from models of machine politics, in which a machine holds recipients of handouts accountable for their subsequent political behavior. Yet vote buying is common in many contexts where political party machines are not present, or where parties exert little effort in monitoring voters. This article addresses this puzzle. The author argues that politicians often distribute electoral handouts to convey information to voters. This vote buying conveys information with respect to the future provision of resources to the poor. The author tests the argument with original qualitative and experimental data collected in Kenya. A voter’s information about a candidate’s vote buying leads to substantial increases in electoral support, an effect driven by expectations about the provision of clientelist benefits beyond the electoral period. The results, showing that the distribution of material benefits can be electorally effective for persuasive reasons, thereby explain how vote buying can be effective in the absence of machine politics.
影响因子：
10.7
作者：
Burgess, Robin;Jedwab, Remi;Padro i Miquel, Gerard
通讯作者：
Padro i Miquel, Gerard