Time horizon of government and public goods investment: Evidence from Japan
Time horizon of government and public goods investment: Evidence from Japan
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政府和公共产品投资的时间范围：来自日本的证据
DOI：
10.1016/j.jdeveco.2020.102518
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发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
Yamasaki Junichi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ting Yin,Junchao Zhang;Junchao Zhang;Junchao Zhang;張俊超;張俊超;張俊超;張俊超;張俊超;張俊超;Junchao Zhang;Yamasaki Junichi
政治代理人任期越长是否会带来更好的公共政策，这是政治经济学的一个核心问题。保有权保障延长了独裁者的时间范围，这可能解释了采掘型制度下的经济增长。这项研究使用17世纪日本的地方数据估计了地方独裁者较长时间范围的因果影响。当时的地方领主面临着按照中央政府的命令转移他们的领地的风险。1651年，中央政府执行领导人的去世引发了一场政策改革，它不成比例地降低了特定地方领主(内部人士)出于看似外生的原因所面临的转移风险。通过将历史数据集数字化并使用差异法，我发现1651年之后在内部人领域的农业投资相对更大。补充分析表明，这种影响是由较长的时间范围渠道驱动的，而不是职业关注或当地经历渠道。
Whether the longer tenure of political agents leads to better public policies is a central question in political economy. Tenure security extends the time horizons of dictators, which may explain economic growth under extractive institutions. This study estimates the causal impact of longer time horizons of local dictators using sub-national data from 17th-century Japan. Local lords at that time faced the risk of transferring their domains by order of the central government. In 1651, the death of the executive leader of the central government caused a policy reform, and it disproportionally reduced the transfer risk faced by particular local lords (insiders) for plausibly exogenous reasons. By digitizing the historical dataset and using the difference-in-differences method, I find relatively greater agricultural investment in insiders' domains after 1651. Supplemental analyses indicate that this effect is driven by the longer time horizon channel rather than the career concern or local experience channel.