RECIPROCITY WITHOUT COMMITMENT - CHARACTERIZATION AND PERFORMANCE OF INFORMAL INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS
RECIPROCITY WITHOUT COMMITMENT - CHARACTERIZATION AND PERFORMANCE OF INFORMAL INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS
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DOI：
10.1016/0304-3878(93)90102-s
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发表时间：
1993-02-01
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
RAVALLION, M
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
COATE, S;RAVALLION, M
在不发达的农业经济中，各种风险分担安排很常见，因为家庭没有正式的合同执行手段，也很少有机会进入风险市场。在信息不对称较少的环境中，通过反复互动，社会保险仍然是可能的。在一个简单的重复博弈模型中，两个自私自利的家庭面临独立的收入流，我们描述了可以维持为非合作均衡的最佳安排。我们精确地建立了这种最优非正式安排与第一种最佳风险分担的不同之处，并确定了两者之间分歧最大的条件。
Various risk sharing arrangements are common in underdeveloped agrarian economies where households have no formal means of contract enforcement and little access to risk markets. Social insurance is still possible through repeated interaction in an environment with few informational asymmetries. In a simple repeated game model of two self-interested households facing independent income streams, we characterize the best arrangement that can be sustained as a noncooperative equilibrium. We establish precisely how this optimal informal arrangement differs from first best-risk sharing, and identify the conditions under which the divergence between the two is greatest.