The irrationality of recalcitrant emotions
The irrationality of recalcitrant emotions
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DOI：
10.1007/s11098-008-9241-1
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发表时间：
2009-09-01
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
Brady, Michael S.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Brady, Michael S.
顽固的情绪是与评价性判断相冲突的情绪。 （一个标准的例子是，尽管有人相信飞行几乎没有危险，但还是害怕飞行。）情绪顽抗现象给情绪理论提出了一个重要问题，即解释顽抗情绪涉及理性冲突的意义。在本文中，我认为现有的“新判断主义”情绪解释未能对顽固情绪的非理性提供合理的解释，并发展和捍卫我自己的新判断主义解释。在我看来，顽固的情绪是非理性的，因为它们使主体倾向于接受主体已经拒绝的评价性解释。
A recalcitrant emotion is one which conflicts with evaluative judgement. (A standard example is where someone is afraid of flying despite believing that it poses little or no danger.) The phenomenon of emotional recalcitrance raises an important problem for theories of emotion, namely to explain the sense in which recalcitrant emotions involve rational conflict. In this paper I argue that existing 'neojudgementalist' accounts of emotions fail to provide plausible explanations of the irrationality of recalcitrant emotions, and develop and defend my own neojudgementalist account. On my view, recalcitrant emotions are irrational insofar as they incline the subject to accept an evaluative construal that the subject has already rejected.