Are Cloud FPGAs Really Vulnerable to Power Analysis Attacks?
Are Cloud FPGAs Really Vulnerable to Power Analysis Attacks?
复制标题
云 FPGA 真的容易受到功耗分析攻击吗？
DOI：
10.23919/date48585.2020.9116481
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发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Mirjana Stojilović
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ognjen Glamočanin;Louis Coulon;F. Regazzoni;Mirjana Stojilović
最近的工作已经证明了通过远程功耗分析攻击从运行在FPGA上的密码核心中提取秘密的可能性。为了发起这些攻击，攻击者在FPGA逻辑中实现电压波动传感器，记录目标加密核心的功耗，并通过对记录的轨迹运行功率分析攻击来恢复密钥。尽管表明功率分析也可以在没有物理访问加密核心的情况下执行，但这些工作主要是在受控环境中的专用FPGA板上进行的，这就留下了一个问题，即成功地将这些攻击安装在部署在云中的真实的系统上的可能性。在本文中，我们首次展示了对在Amazon EC2 F1实例上运行的AES加密加速器的成功密钥恢复攻击。我们使用基于延迟线的电压降传感器收集电源迹线，该传感器适用于Amazon EC2 F1上使用的Xilinx Virtex Ultrascale+架构，其中CARRY 8模块在其输出端没有单调延迟增加。我们的研究结果表明，多租户FPGA提出的安全问题确实是有效的，应该采取对策来缓解这些问题。
Recent works have demonstrated the possibility of extracting secrets from a cryptographic core running on an FPGA by means of remote power analysis attacks. To mount these attacks, an adversary implements a voltage fluctuation sensor in the FPGA logic, records the power consumption of the target cryptographic core, and recovers the secret key by running a power analysis attack on the recorded traces. Despite showing that the power analysis could also be performed without physical access to the cryptographic core, these works were mostly carried out on dedicated FPGA boards in a controlled environment, leaving open the question about the possibility to successfully mount these attacks on a real system deployed in the cloud. In this paper, we demonstrate, for the first time, a successful key recovery attack on an AES cryptographic accelerator running on an Amazon EC2 F1 instance. We collect the power traces using a delay-line based voltage drop sensor, adapted to the Xilinx Virtex Ultrascale+ architecture used on Amazon EC2 F1, where CARRY8 blocks do not have a monotonic delay increase at their outputs. Our results demonstrate that security concerns raised by multitenant FPGAs are indeed valid and that countermeasures should be put in place to mitigate them.
使用云 FPGA 中的环形振荡器测量长线泄漏
DOI：
10.1109/fpl.2019.00017
发表时间：
2019
期刊：
International Conference on Field-Programmable Logic and Applications
影响因子：
--
作者：
Giechaskiel, Ilias;Rasmussen, Kasper Bonne;Szefer, Jakub
通讯作者：
Szefer, Jakub