“I” and the brain
“I” and the brain
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“我”和大脑
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发表时间：
2012
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Béatrice Longuenesse
中科院分区：
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作者：
Béatrice Longuenesse
许多哲学家和许多生物心理学家认为，最近在神经心理学方面的实验已经彻底否定了任何意志自由的概念。我认为，以自然因果决定论的名义反对意志自由概念的论点是有价值的，但不是新的，它们完整地保留了与因果决定论相容的意志自由概念。在解释了这个概念之后，我认为它与我们使用第一人称代词“我”有有趣的关系。我讨论了我们在思想和语言中使用“我”的三个例子，并提出了一些我想让神经心理学家回答的问题，这些问题与可能构成这些用法的大脑过程有关。我认为回答这些问题将支持我在第一部分中提出的意志自由的相容主义概念。
Many philosophers as well as many biological psychologists think that recent experiments in neuropsychology have definitively discredited any notion of freedom of the will. I argue that the arguments mounted against the concept of freedom of the will in the name of natural causal determinism are valuable but not new, and that they leave intact a concept of freedom of the will that is compatible with causal determinism. After explaining this concept, I argue that it is interestingly related to our use of the first person pronoun “I.” I discuss three examples of our use of “I” in thought and language and submit a few questions I would like neuropsychologists to answer concerning the brain processes that might underlie those uses. I suggest answering these questions would support the compatibilist notion of freedom of the will I have offered in part 1.