A Sociotechnical Approach to the Museum Congestion Management Problem
A Sociotechnical Approach to the Museum Congestion Management Problem
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DOI：
10.1109/tcss.2019.2963558
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发表时间：
2020-04
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
Athina Thanou;E. Tsiropoulou;S. Papavassiliou
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Athina Thanou;E. Tsiropoulou;S. Papavassiliou
在这篇文章中，博物馆的拥挤管理问题的社会技术考虑，通过处理博物馆作为动态的社会系统，在那里的经验的势头是由游客自己控制。游客被认为是前景理论效用最大化，其行为风险的态度不仅影响他们的个人决策和经验，但也影响其他人，从而创造了一个相互依存的社会系统。为了解决在这样一个概率和不确定的环境中的拥挤问题，定价被引入作为一种有效的机制，以驱动游客在有效的运营点的行动，保持博物馆运营的稳定性。相应的问题，确定每个参观者在博物馆展品投资的时间，以优化他们获得的经验，表示通过适当设计的前景理论的效用函数与定价，制定和处理作为一个非合作博弈。利用S-模对策理论证明了该模型的存在性和收敛性。在此基础上，研究和分析了博物馆定价作为拥挤管理工具的有效性和有效性。
In this article, a sociotechnical consideration of the congestion management problem in museums is presented, by treating museums as dynamic social systems, where the momentum of the experience is controlled by visitors themselves. Visitors are considered as prospect-theoretic utility maximizers, whose behavioral risk attitudes affect not only their personal decisions and experiences but also those of others, thus creating an interdependent social system. To address the congestion problem within such a probabilistic and uncertain environment, pricing is introduced as an effective mechanism to drive visitor actions in efficient operation points, preserving museum operation stability. The corresponding problem of determining the time invested by each visitor at museum exhibits toward optimizing their obtained experience, as expressed via properly designed prospect-theoretic utility functions with pricing, is formulated and treated as a noncooperative game. The theory of S-modular games is adopted to prove existence and convergence to Nash equilibrium. Based on this framework, we study and analyze the validity and effectiveness of pricing as a tool to manage congestion in museums.