Demandingness Objections in Ethics
Demandingness Objections in Ethics
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道德中的苛求反对
DOI：
10.1093/pq/pqw020
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Brian Mcelwee
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Brian Mcelwee
对于道德哲学家来说，拒绝一种道德理论是很常见的，因为它的结论是不合理的要求--它要求我们太多人才能正确地解释我们的道德义务。尽管这样的反对意见经常让我们感到有说服力，但它们引起了两个挑战：要求性反对意见真的独立于对道德理论的其他反对意见吗？难道标准的需求反对不预先假定，由小康承担的成本比由穷人承担的成本更重要吗？这些挑战导致一些作者质疑是否真的有令人信服的需求反对，尽管他们最初的强烈呼吁。大卫索贝尔认为，标准的要求性反对是“无能的”，利亚姆墨菲认为，他们可以“解散”。在本文中，我的目标是通过解决这两个挑战来证明需求性反对的可能性。
It is common for moral philosophers to reject a moral theory on the basis that its verdicts are unreasonably demanding—it requires too much of us to be a correct account of our moral obligations. Even though such objections frequently strike us as convincing, they give rise to two challenges: Are demandingness objections really independent of other objections to moral theories? Do standard demandingness objections not presuppose that costs borne by the comfortably off are more important than costs borne by the poor? These challenges have led some writers to question whether there really can be convincing demandingness objections, notwithstanding their strong initial appeal. David Sobel has argued that standard demandingness objections are ‘impotent’, Liam Murphy that they can be ‘dissolved’. In this paper, I aim to vindicate the possibility of demandingness objections by addressing these two challenges.