Financial Fraud, Director Reputation, and Shareholder Wealth
Financial Fraud, Director Reputation, and Shareholder Wealth
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.687412
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发表时间：
2006-04
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Eliezer M. Fich;Anil Shivdasani
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Eliezer M. Fich;Anil Shivdasani
我们以面临股东集体诉讼的公司为样本，调查财务欺诈对外部董事的声誉影响。在财务欺诈诉讼之后，外部董事不会面临被起诉公司董事会的异常更替，但会经历其他董事会席位的显著下降。当欺诈指控更为严重，外部董事在监督欺诈方面承担更大责任时，其他董事职位的下降幅度更大。与被诉公司共享董事的联锁公司在提起诉讼时估值下降。在公司治理较强的公司，与欺诈有关的董事更有可能失去董事职位，他们的离职与这些公司的估值上升有关。
We investigate the reputational impact of financial fraud for outside directors based on a sample of firms facing shareholder class action lawsuits. Following a financial fraud lawsuit, outside directors do not face abnormal turnover on the board of the sued firm but experience a significant decline in other board seats held. This decline in other directorships is greater for more severe allegations of fraud and when the outside director bears greater responsibility for monitoring fraud. Interlocked firms that share directors with the sued firm exhibit valuation declines at the lawsuit filing. Fraud-affiliated directors are more likely to lose directorships at firms with stronger corporate governance and their departure is associated with valuation increases for these firms.