The Minority's Duty of Loyalty in Close Corporations
The Minority's Duty of Loyalty in Close Corporations
复制标题
封闭公司中少数人的忠诚义务
DOI：
10.2307/1371833
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发表时间：
1972
期刊：
影响因子：
1.9
通讯作者：
J. Hetherington
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Hetherington
我们习惯于将公司股票主要视为财产，而将股东，特别是少数股东视为行使财产所有者权利的自由代理人。本条的目的是表明，在某些情况下，少数股东与其他合同和财产权持有人一样，在行使其作为股票所有者的权利时，可能有义务考虑到其他当事方的利益。支持这一主张的论据是以公司法和商法中确立的原则为基础的。公司法原则是常见的忠诚义务，它被强加于管理层和控股股东;商业概念是那些要求商业上合理的行为和避免商业交易中的不合理行为的概念。本文第一和第二部分简要讨论了公司法和商法的概念，第三部分讨论了前几部分阐述的原则，涉及在某些情况下封闭式公司中少数股东的行为。
We are accustomed to thinking of corporate stock primarily as property, and of stockholders, particularly minority stockholders, as free agents in the exercise of their rights as property owners. The purpose of this article is to show that there are situations in which minority shareholders, like other holders of contract and property rights, may be obligated when exercising their rights as owners of stock to take the interests of other parties into account. The arguments for this proposition are based on principles which are well established in corporation law and in commercial law. The corporation law principle is the familiar duty of loyalty which is imposed on management and controlling shareholders; the commercial concepts are those requiring commercially reasonable behavior and the avoidance of unconscionable conduct in business dealings. The corporation and commercial law concepts are discussed briefly in parts I and II of the article, and in part III the principles developed in the preceding parts are related to the conduct of minority shareholders in close corporations in certain types of situations.