Using Reserve Prices to Deter Collusion in Procurement Competition
Using Reserve Prices to Deter Collusion in Procurement Competition
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利用保留价阻止采购竞争中的串通行为
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-6427.2005.00257.x
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Charles J. Thomas
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Charles J. Thomas
为了加深我们对采购环境中共谋的理解，本文定量评估了买方对底价的选择如何影响先前设计的两种共谋计划的可持续性。如果买方没有战略性地选择其底价，那么在各种看似合理的折扣因素下，串通可能是可持续的。然而，即使是稍微复杂的底价选择也可以极大地缩小串通可持续的折扣因素集。这些发现支持了现有的论点，即买方容易串通，但它们也表明买方拥有可以诱导卖方采取竞争行为以获利的工具。
To enhance our understanding of collusion in procurement settings, this paper quantitatively evaluates how the buyer's choice of a reserve price influences the sustainability of two previously devised collusive schemes. If the buyer does not select its reserve price strategically, then collusion may be sustainable for a wide range of plausible discount factors. However, even mildly sophisticated reserve price selection can dramatically shrink the set of discount factors for which collusion is sustainable. These findings support existing arguments that buyers are vulnerable to collusion, but they also suggest that buyers possess tools that may profitably induce sellers to act competitively.